if not more, internal or "intranational" dis p lacees in Africa as there are international ones, and this further compounds the problem of enumerating the totality of the continent's involuntary migrants. It is clear that Africa continues to be one of the world's two principal arenas of refugee movements -the other being the outflow from Af g hanistan to nei g hboring Pakistan and Iran. Since the late 1950s, ref ugee migrations have been an ever-gro wing by-product of the continent's emergence fro m colonialism. Beginning in the mid 1950s with the exodus from Algeria during its war for independence, and followed almost immediatel y with the displacement within and outside Southern Sudan during the civil war that erupted on the eve of Sudan's independence, the number of refugees in Africa has grown steadily, as has the number of states responsible for generating them. B y 1970, there were over one million officiall y recognized refugees on the continent (Aga-Khan, 1971) , and at the time of the OAU ' s 1979 conference in Arusha, Tanzania, on the African refugee dilemma, it was estimated that their numbers had reached 3.5 million (Nyerere, 1979) . Since then, numbers did decline sli ghtly during the earl y 1980s, onl y to rise again in the latter years of the decade as new problem areas have emerged.
While numbers in central Africa appear to have stabilized , for example, the Horn of Africa continues to experience growth in its refugee population. Between them, the four countries of the Horn -Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan -are currentl y accommodating about 1.5 million refugees (US Committee for Refugees, 1988) . In addition, the area also has many intranational displacees, especially in Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, which brings the total regional involuntary migran t population close to, if not exceeding, that of Af g hans residing in Pakistan and Iran.
In southern Africa , nearly a million Mozambiquans (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1988) have sought refuge in the past three years in nei g hboring countries, and especiall y in Malawi, a country that had not previously experienced any significan t refugee in-migrations. Until the mid-1970s, little or no academic interest had been shown in this component of Africa ' s migrant populations. However, over the past decade, a growing bod y of researchers have focused their attention on many dimensions ofAfrica 's refugee problems. In particular, there have been a number of reviews of the scale, directions, causes and consequences of Africa 's refugee migrations (Gould, 1974; Rubin , 1974; Rogge, 1977; Adepoju, 1981; Kibreab, 1985) ; there have been some good analyses of the difficulties encountered b y rural refugees (Chambers, 1979; Hansen, 1981; Betts, 1984) ; there is a growing volume of studies of the successes and failings of local settlement schemes for refugees (Potten, 1976; Nelder, 1979; Rogge, 1981; Harrell-Bond, 1982; Gasarasi, 1984) (Stein, 1981; Karadawi, 1983; Pitterman, 1984; dark and Stein, 1984; Harrell-Bond, 1985) . 
OPTIONS FOR AFRICA 'S REFUGEES
There are basicall y three desirable and durable options available to resolve a ref ugee problem: 1) local integration and settlement; 2) third-country resettlement; and 3) voluntary repatriation to country of ori g in. Other options also exist, such as the long-term confinement of refugees to holding camps until some other solution manifests itself, or the forcible repatriation or refoulement of refugees. These options are clearl y undesirable; the devastating long-term impact that protracted camp confinemen t has upon refugees is nowhere better illustrated than by the Palestinian refugees, and the tragic consequences of refoulement are shown by the fate that befell many Khmer refugees pushed back across the border b y Thai authorities in 1979.
Of the three durable options, local integration and settlement has been the rule for most of Africa since the firs t refugee populations began to appear. It has taken the form of spontaneous integration in some cases, while elsewhere, organized agricul tural settlement schemes have been established. In many instances, refugees have successfull y integrated among host communities, becoming full y self-supporting so that international assistance was no longer needed for their support. Indeed, two African states, Tanzania and Botswana, have even bestowed citizenship on some of their successfull y integrated refugee communities. However, not all attempts at local integration and settlement have been problems free, and long-term international assistance continues to be necessary in many instances. For example, Sudan ' s attempts to create self-supporting agricultural and wage-earning rural settlements for Ethiopian refugees in Eastern Sudan illustrates many of the problems and frustrations associated with the implementation of organized settlement schemes (Rogge, 1985) . Indeed, the possibility of third country resettlement for African refugees began onl y after the passage of the U.S. Refugee Act; it established a specific quota of 3000 resettlement p laces annuall y for refugees from Africa. Canada followed with a similar policy in 1981, creating a resettlement planning level of 500 for Africa , which was increased to 1000 in 1983.
Australia is the onl y other western country that currentl y has a specific resettlement quota for African refugees , having introduced it in 1984 for 220 per annum. Thus while western states have recognized resettlement as a necessary response to Southeast Asia's refugees, they continue to regard Africa ' s refugees as essentiall y an African problem , and permit onl y limited resettlement opportunities for refugees from the continent.
Among the many reasons for this prevailing attitude towards Africa 's refugees is the fact that most western leaders share a view also held widel y b y most African governments, namely, that repatriation of refugees is the optimum solution to Africa's ref ugee problem. Given that one of the maj or causes of refugee movements in Africa has traditionall y been anti-colonial warfare, and given that each of these wars, with the exception of Namibia's, has now been resolved with independence being granted, the prospects for refugees eventuall y return home have always appeared to be favorable.
Certainl y the record of successful repatriation following independence wars has been positive in the past (See , Table 1 ). However, few of today's refugees are being generated b y causes that are likel y to be short-term.
Instead, most contemporary refugee populations will likely remain in exile for considerable periods of time, if not permanently. It is useful , therefore, to review more closel y the nature and prospects for repatriation in Africa , as well as look at some of the problems inherent in the adoption of this option in attempts to resolve Africa 's refugee dilemma.
THE SCALE AND DIRECTION OF RE PATRIATIONS IN AFRICA
There appear to be little or no data on many of the repatriation exercises that have taken place in Africa since the firs t modern refugee exoduses began. Nor have there been many evaluations of the nature and success, or resultant problems, of any of the maj or repatriations. This lack of analysis is not unique to Africa; not a single substantive evaluation was produced on the greatest repatriation of modern times, namely, that of the excep tions to this generalization is a stud y of Southern Sudanese repatriates and the varying degrees of success they have had in rehabilitating themselves in the South following their return afte r the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972 (Akol, 1986) . Another significan t recent contribution to the literature on repatriation is Crisp 's (1984a Crisp 's ( , 1984b ) critical examination of repatriation programs for Ethiopians from Djibouti and Ugandans from Zaire and Sudan. However, apart from such studies, there is an acute paucity of literature on this facet of Africa's refugee problem. Yet g iven the number of refugees that remain in exile, and in view of the prevailing general sentiment in Africa that repatriation remains the optimum solution to refugee problems, there is evidentl y a need to better understand past repatriation experiences and the problems that have been generated b y repatriation processes.
It is clear that repatriation has been a widel y used option for African refugees. The earliest of the contemporary refugee migrations -the Algerian exodus during that country's war of independence -repatriated fro m Morocco and Tunisia immediately after the cessation of hostilities and set the pattern for many of Africa ' s maj or refugee migra tions thereafter. Table 1 summarizes the annual size and maj or directions of repatriations since the earl y 1970s. Some 2.5 million of Africa 's refugees have returned to their country of ori g in over the past seventeen years, and in most cases these return movements were completed speedily and included almost all of the exiled communities. For example, the return of Southern Sudanese to Sudan, which began almost immediately after the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed , was essentiall y completed in a little over two years (See Table 1 ). Likewise, Guinea Bissauans returned from Senegal within months of independence, Mozambiquans returned from Tanzania over a two year span, and the return to Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House Agreement was also speedy (most Zimbabweans were home within a year). Indeed, the repatriation of over 250,000 Zimbabweans, as well as the resettlement of another 750,000 persons who had been displaced internall y during the independence war, must count among the most successful of all of Africa 's repatriation and resettlement programs, with some 600,000 displacees be ne fi tting directl y fro m $140 million worth of assistance that was provided b y UNHCR to the Zimbabwean government (UNHCR , 1982) . For the firs t time in Africa , large scale assistance from UNHCR had also been rendered to internal repatriates; persons who had not previousl y been recognized as refugees b y UNHCR. In most of these instances, the complete refugee community repatriated, although there have been some exceptions to this norm. For example, a few thousand Sudanese remained in Uganda because they saw few prospects for themselves in a return to war-ravaged Southern Sudan; they had become self sufficient and integrated into either Uganda's rural or urban milieu and were thus reluctant to abandon their acquired ways of life. Some Mozambiquans in Southern Tanzania reacted in the same way following Mozambiquan independence, and a few hundred repatriates, after returning and confro n ting the stark reality of conditions in Northern
Mozambique after a decade of war, chose subsequen tly to migrate to their former settlements in Tanzania. Neither Uganda nor Tanzania were insistent that all refugees repatriate. In the case of Guinea Bissau, some 5000 refugees were permitted to remain in Senegal; their reasons for not returning were both political and economic. Onl y in Angola has the end of an independence war not resulted in a mass repatriation of refugees.
There, the ensuing civil war, coupled with an understandable reluctance on the part of the MPLA government to receive back large numbers of repatriating refugees unsympathetic to it, has resulted in one half of all Angolan refugees still remaining in exile in Zaire and Zambia a decade after independence. As Table 1 illustrates, there have been several years during which substantial repatriations were achieved, with 1981-82 experiencing the sing le largest return movements: a total of 327,281 refugees voluntaril y returned to their country of ori g in in that year. Substantive repatriations have also occurred each year since 1985, due largel y to the return of drought displacees fro m Sudan. Moreover, it must be stressed that these numbers refer onl y to refugees repatriating with UNHCR assistance or with the agency 's awareness. Many more spontaneousl y settled refugees repatriate themselves parallel to organized repatriations and are most likel y omitted from data shown in these totals. These data demonstrate the important role that repatriation has played over the past decade and a half in resolving some of Africa 's refugee crises. The question that remains, however, is to what extent repatriation is likel y to continue to play a maj or role in the future. As Table 2 suggests, many sizable refugee communities remain in exile throughout the continent, including some 1.5 million in the Horn of Africa , about 350,000 Angolans, over 350,000 Rwandans, and about 225,000 Ugandans. Some one million new refugees have recentl y been added to these large numbers, especiall y since mid-1987 -Mozambiquans who have fled into all of their neighboring states, including South Africa. Although some of these residual refugees have good prospects for eventuall y repatriating, such as the Namibians when Namibia gains independence, or the Ugandans if the Museveni government can restore civil order to Northern and Western Uganda, others are likel y to remain exiled for a long time if not permanently, such as the Barundi in Rwanda and Tanzania, or the Rwandans in Uganda and Burundi. However, it must be recognized that any attempts to predict when and where repatriations are likel y to take p lace in Africa are hi g hl y speculative, if not completely futile tasks. 
PROB LEMS ASSOCIATE D WIT H RE PATRIATION
Although African states continue to regard repatriation as the ideal solution, there are, nevertheless, many p itfalls, frustrations and social and economic costs associated with it (Janda, 1986) . A comprehe nsive discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article; however, an enumeration of problems is possible here.
First, there are a number of social problems oftenencountered b y repatriates. The longer refugees have been in exile, the greater is their acculturation to their host society . This is especiall y the case with "event alienated" refugees, who tend to abandon all identification with their home areas. Many ref ugees rapidly become full y integrated, especially when they find ref uge among ethnicall y similar societies. Second generation refugees are certainl y no longer a rarity in Africa today . In North America, we regularl y witness the cultural watersheds that develop between firs t and second generation immigrants. African refugees are not too different in this regard. And there are now even some third generation refugees. For many long-term refugees , therefore, repatriation does not necessarily mean " going-home". Instead, they return to p laces or social environments that are different or appear to have changed, or, alternatively, where the resident population regard the returnees as strangers because of differing customs and beliefs that they have acquired.
Considerable problems of readjustment arise, therefore, both for returnees and for communities into which they return. These problem are accentuated b y language barriers created when refu gees return fro m areas where different lingua-francas existed. Refugee children may have become completely educated in the language of their asylum state and therefore need to readjust to the language of their home area. Second generation refugees may never have learned the lingua-franca of their home regions.
These problems are vividl y illustrated in Eastern Sudan, where Eritrean and Tigrean refugee children are educated in Arabic (language and script) using a Sudanese curriculum. Even allowing for the fact that some token classes are sometimes g iven in the vernacular, one can onl y speculate how readil y and speedily such refugees would be able to adjust to an Amharic dominated society if they were to repatriate.
These problems can also be illustrated b y the Southern Sudanese returnees of 1972-1974, who had sought refuge in Zaire, Uganda and Central African Republic (CAR). Those who had fled to CAR did so p rimaril y as whole village communities and, on arriving in CAR, were settled on organized agricultural settlements at M'Boki together with their ethnic kin (UNHCR, 1969) . They appear to have had very little interaction with local people, and although a few learned French, most underwent little or no cultural or social adj ustments . They returned to Sudan afte r 1972 in much the same way as they had left, and thus had little di ff icul ty reintegrating into their home milieu. A somewhat similar situation was experienced b y Southerners who fled to Zaire. They, too, established themselves in ethnicall y homogeneous communities or integrated into ethnicall y similar (Azande) Zairean villages. On their return, few adjustmen t proble ms were experienced. In Uganda, however . Southern Sudanese refugees were exposed to a much more heterogeneous society .
Indeed, Sudanese refugees diffused throughout rural and urban Northern and Central Uganda. Even those settled on ethnicall y homogeneous organized agricul tural settlements underwent considerable transformations in attitudes and economic behavior due to their hi g h levels of interaction with local Ugandans and because of the modern development strategies they were introduced to on the schemes. Also, it was fro m the refugee population exiled in Uganda during the civil war that most of the post-war educated manpower for the South was subsequentl y drawn, since virtuall y all formal schooling had ceased to exist in Southern Sudan during the war. A consequence of this was that many refugees returning fro m Uganda had considerable difficul ty readj usting to the South after their return. Considerable alienation between exile and returnee frequentl y developed. Terrill (1983) has shown this to be the case for Acholi who returned to Torit district, and Akol (1987) has illustrated this for refugees returning to Yei district. It is also significan t to point out that the whole generation of Southerners that had acquired all their education in exile in Uganda had not receive any instruction in the Arabic language, nor had they been introduced to any of the nuances of Islamic culture.
A second group of issues relate to an array of economic problems frequen tl y encountered b y repatriates or potential repatriates. Refugees have ofte n become self-reliant in their asylum states; this is, after all, the fundamental obj ective of the most widel y promoted durable solution. Thus, a basic question that arises is whether or not all refugees want to repatriate. Do they want to abandon their accrued economic circumstances and risk having to start all over again on return to their home areas? This problem is especiall y serious when their home areas have been ravaged b y protracted wars. Moreover, they are faced with the knowledge that the farmland they abandoned when they fled into exile will have regenerated to bush, and will thus require costl y reclearing and rehabilitation. This will almost certainl y apply to their villages, too.
A further problem occasionall y encountered is that of the freedom refugees have of also repatriating accumulated wealth and personal belongings. There have been instances where repatriates have had to abandon belongings or businesses, or even where these were confiscated b y local authorities at the border. Angolans returning fro m Zaire in the late 1970s, for example, were subj ect to such harassment. The knowledge that they risk losing accumulated wealth or economic status may well act REPATRIATION: AFRICA'S REFUGEE DILEMMA 195 as a strong deterrent to repatriation. This is especially the case when the asylum country is not particularl y insistent about whether or not the refugees return.
Refugees repatriating from areas where they have become full y selfreliant, or from organized settlement schemes where they have become accustomed to basic infrastructural services provided b y an array of voluntary agencies, may experience on their return a marked regression in standard of living and economic opportunities. On the other hand, the experiences and skills acquired while in exile on settlement schemes or in urban areas are transferable on their return and may result in the creation of economic conditions superior to those existing prior to their fli g ht into exile or to those prevailing among local residents who did not go into exile.
All of these difficulties were encountered, to a greater or lesser degree, b y Southern Sudanese repatriates after 1972. Many of those settled on agricultural settlement schemes in CAR and Uganda had achieved considerable levels of self-reliance, if not complete self-sufficiency, which they abandoned on returning to their war-devastated home villages and lands.
Indeed, all Southerners returning from exile were faced with a completely destroyed social and economic infrastructure. All schools and health stations had been closed and abandoned. Few roads were passable and almost every bridge in the South was destroyed. The bush had invaded their lands and extensive clearing was required before the first crops could be p lanted. A Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was established b y the Sudanese government to assist with the reintegration of refugees (as well as some 800,000 internall y displaced people), and it was able to provide some limited material and financial assista nce to returnees. However, the level of assistance fell desperatel y short of the needs generated b y the returnees.
For the most part, the returnees were essentiall y left to their own devices. Those that had lived on organized settlements, especiall y in Uganda, and who had thus become accustomed to basic services such as schools, clinics or improved water supplies, had particularly difficul t times readjusting to their essentiall y unserviced home areas.
On the positive side, however, the returnees fro m Uganda successfull y transferred back to Sudan the sophisticated levels of agricultural technology they had acquired. During their exile, they had been introduced to new crops, as well as to new cropping systems, and these were adopted in the South on their return. Akol (1987) has shown that levels of economic well-being of former displacees had, by the late 1970s, led to considerable differentiation between those who had been in Uganda vis-vis refugees who had fled into Zaire or who had spent the war hiding in the bush within the South. The former of these groups, who repatriated to the Yei area, achieved significan t levels of economic prosperity and considered themselves relativel y better off than they had been prior to going into exile. A third set of problems encountered b y repatriates is of a political nature. B y accepting that repatriation is the ideal solution, the assumption is thereb y made that governments of refugees' countries of ori g in are prepared to readmit repatriates. However, this is not necessaril y the case.
Refugees are ofte n regarded as being politically hostile to the government of the home country and, consequently, may not be welcome for fear of the opposition they may create. This is especiall y the case where refugees have been associated with, or are believed to be sympathetic to, past or present insurgencies. Even where refugees are not seen as potential political agitators or malcontents, they may not be welcome home simply because of the additional costs and burdens they p lace upon the home government through their resettlement and rehabilitation needs.
A related issue is that of how refugees are regarded by their host government when conditions make repatriation viable. Do host governments always want refugees to return? How do they react to refugees who are reluctant to return? Should they apply force to persuade refugees to repatriate? Also, there is a danger that a considerable perception gap may exist between how a host government views the viability and safety of repatriation, especiall y if it is anxious to be relieved of its burden of refugees , and how refugees may regard conditions prevailing in their home countries and whether or not they see it as safe to return. The perception of the safety for Ethiopian repatriates that was held b y the government of Djibouti, and which was endorsed b y LJNHCR (Aitchison, 1984) , was certainly not shared by many Ethiopian refugees destined for repatriation. The media reports that later suggested that as many as one half of all repatriates fro m Djibouti subsequen tl y sought refuge in other countries appear to confirm assertions that this repatriation was far from being completely voluntary . One additional dimension to this p roblem is when refugees have become economicall y integrated into regional development strategies for their asylum areas. Their departure can actuall y have detrimental impacts upon regions of refugee settlement. Regional economies may have become geared to the abundant (and cheap) labor resource that refugees provide, and thus their departure would severel y affect the economy. Under such conditions, governments may not be overl y anxious to see refugees leave when the opportunity arises. Many Mozambiquans remained in southern Tanzania, for example, and Senegal was quite willing to keep Guinea Bissauans who did not wish to repatriate. And, although Eastern Sudan currently considers itself totally inundated by far too many refugees, were they all to suddenl y depart, the many irrigation schemes and the large sorghum and sesame estates of the Butana Plain would be hard pressed to find alternative sources of affordable labor.
In the case of the southern Sudanese refugees in 1972, all were strongl y encouraged to repatriate b y their respective host governments. However, Uganda was somewhat less insistent than the others, and some 13,000
Southerners eventuall y opted to remain. Indeed, many of those who remained were subsequen tl y recruited into Idi Amin's security forces (the so-called "Nubis"). The fact that some refugees chose not to return and many others delayed their return for up to two years after the Addis Ababa Agreement-onl y 45,000 of the 220,000 refugees repatriated during 1972 -was in part a result of lingering mistrust among refugees of the Sudanese government 's intent and sincerity. Memories remained of refugees who had returned in response to earlier amnesties during the civil war and who had subsequen tl y disappeared, and many thus adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude (Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, 1973) . Such reluctance to return for fear of personal security is common to many repatriation exercises, and there is clearl y a need for the establishment of an effective and independent mechanism that can provide convincing assurances to refugees that a return to their home areas is a truly safe option.
The question of how much pressure should be p laced upon refugees to repatriate also remains a very delicate one, especially when there remains uncertainty about how genuine the home country 's contention is that refugees are free to return without fear of retribution. There have been several recent examples where the dividing line between voluntary repatriation and refoulement has become blurred (Crisp, 1984a and 1984b) . Indeed, UNHCR's recognition of this problem caused a special Round Table on Voluntary Repatriation to take p lace in San Remo, Italy, in 1985 (UNHCR, 1985 , at which the agency reaffir med the p rinci p le of 'voluntariness' in repatriation.
The report of the Round Table also recognized UNHCR's responsibility in assisting with the reintegration of returnees after they reach their home territories. This recognition is hi g hly significan t in that it breaks new ground for the agenc/s role in achieving durable solutions. Up to then, its role had usuall y ended once repatriating refugees reached die border of their home country, although the substantial assistance provided b y the agency during 1980-1981 to assist with Zimbabwe's repatriation and resettlement of displacees indicates that it earlier become attuned to the needs for assistance created b y repatriation exercises.
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that repatriation as an optimum solution to the problem of Africa 's refugees is not necessarily always the easiest or least problematic of solutions, nor one that is free of substantial costs and frustrations . Yet, g iven that there currentl y remain well over three million officiall y recognized refugees on the continent, and g iven that third country resettlement will remain an option open only to a small minority of refugees, local integration and settlement on the one hand and repatriation on the other hand will continue to be the principal avenues through which the continent's refugee dilemma is resolved.
It is conceivable that, as the primary causes of refugee movements in Afric a shift from confro ntations produced b y the struggle for independence to causes that are essentiall y a product of political instability or oppressive governments, the probability that repatriation will continue to be a maj or durable solution is likel y to diminish somewhat. However, the desire for repatriation remains strong among both governments of asylum states as well as among virtuall y all refugee communities. It also continues to be the dominant policy of the OALJ. There can be little doubt that, g iven satisfactory and lasting political solutions to the causes of most refugee exoduses, almost all of the continent's refugees currently remaining in exile would choose to return home. Thus a population of perhaps as many as three million potential repatriates remain in Africa , and it is therefore critical that there be a much clearer understanding of the specific needs, difficul ties and frustrations associated with this form of return migration.
